21:I[702454,["/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3fhcxj9zqhc73.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0_b8fx_t52fg2.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0ll8kzjunmex-.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2bim9-3dsniwv.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0vs-ypdq9t5l1.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3mvws5jbuibzv.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/181z7f_1svv7z.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0v_ohb1uwrtn-.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/230g6czeidmd1.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3vddxkt_6yxv7.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2sclxp840mdso.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2gxp864netdu6.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3k38m3418g5s4.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/1imwh2zezh79x.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/11t_6dvuhpqqs.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2nx5_d7myyfv2.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2nako0qsny0ux.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/24h8wnxeqz0qp.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3-15ikk8fa680.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2_udiw3e83nia.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2n0dbm48nlgy8.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2_g7748w2-o-8.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/1hgaz6x18w5zl.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/1s5qese6yrc_4.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3a8jhn_2nw1o8.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/11o7oj9o45p28.js"],"ReportPageReady"] 22:I[881013,["/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3fhcxj9zqhc73.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0_b8fx_t52fg2.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0ll8kzjunmex-.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2bim9-3dsniwv.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0vs-ypdq9t5l1.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3mvws5jbuibzv.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/181z7f_1svv7z.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0v_ohb1uwrtn-.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/230g6czeidmd1.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3vddxkt_6yxv7.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2sclxp840mdso.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2gxp864netdu6.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3k38m3418g5s4.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/1imwh2zezh79x.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/11t_6dvuhpqqs.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2nx5_d7myyfv2.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2nako0qsny0ux.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/24h8wnxeqz0qp.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3-15ikk8fa680.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2_udiw3e83nia.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2n0dbm48nlgy8.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2_g7748w2-o-8.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/1hgaz6x18w5zl.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/1s5qese6yrc_4.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3a8jhn_2nw1o8.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/11o7oj9o45p28.js"],"HostedTrainingView"] 2d:I[865300,["/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3fhcxj9zqhc73.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0_b8fx_t52fg2.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0ll8kzjunmex-.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/2bim9-3dsniwv.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/0vs-ypdq9t5l1.js","/_next/static/immutable/chunks/3mvws5jbuibzv.js"],"IconMark"] 23:T126d,# Before you begin This course is for multisig signers and the people responsible for multisig operations. Its six modules cover all 24 controls in the SEAL Framework Checklist for Multisig Operations. You will study governance, risk, signer security, transaction review, communications, and emergency operations, then practice decisions in fictional cases. This is certification-preparation training, not certification. A quiz result shows knowledge; a simulated decision shows how you respond to a staged case. Neither proves that your organization has implemented its controls. Course completion does not authorize you to sign and does not replace a practical skills assessment, a live channel-compromise response test, quarterly reachability tests, or team emergency drills. Keep these types of evidence separate. The assessor decides whether your organization's evidence is sufficient; the checklist does not require the assessor to personally witness every preparation task. Do not paste seed phrases, private keys, recovery materials, credentials, or real contact lists into this platform. Use fictional information for course exercises. Store real operational records and evidence in your organization's approved storage, with access appropriate to their sensitivity. This lesson adapts [SFC Multisig Operations v1.1](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/security-alliance/frameworks/develop/docs/pages/certs/sfc-multisig-ops.mdx), revised April 17, 2026, sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2. The checklist is the source of the requirements below. Preparation tasks help you organize evidence; they are not proof that a control is implemented. ## ms-1.1.1: Name the multisig operations owner Name a person or team accountable for multisig operations. A wallet creator or a chat administrator is not automatically that owner. Everyone involved should know who maintains the policy and who handles problems. The owner's scope must cover all of these responsibilities: - Maintaining multisig policies. - Onboarding and offboarding signers. - Keeping documentation accurate. - Running periodic reviews. - Escalating incidents. For example, your organization can name its security operations team as the owner. The team coordinates signer changes, schedules reviews, maintains the registry, and escalates suspected key compromise. Signers still perform their own checks before signing; naming an owner does not transfer that duty. Preparation task. Draft a fictional ownership record that names the accountable person or team and assigns all five responsibilities. For your organization, locate the approved ownership record and ask the owner to confirm that the responsibilities are actually covered. Keep the confirmation and record in approved storage, not in a course answer. ## ms-1.1.2: Keep a complete multisig registry Maintain a complete, accurate record of every multisig. Each entry must include: - Wallet address and network. - Signing threshold and classification. - Purpose and signer addresses. - Controlled contracts and on-chain roles. - Last review date. A list of treasury addresses alone misses who can authorize actions and what those actions can affect. A multisig that holds little money may still control an upgrade role over a valuable protocol. Record that role and its controlled contracts. Update the registry within 24 hours of a security-critical change and within 3 days of a routine change. Make it accessible to signers and key personnel. These update windows do not grant permission to delay a response to a compromise. Suppose your organization replaces a signer and changes the threshold on Monday morning. These security-critical configuration changes require a registry update within 24 hours. A routine change to a purpose description must be reflected within 3 days. In both cases, authorized personnel need access to the current entry rather than an obsolete spreadsheet. Preparation task. Build a fictional registry entry with every field above, then practice recording a signer change and its update deadline. For organizational preparation, reconcile the approved registry against on-chain configurations, record the review date, and confirm that signers and key personnel can access it. Keep actual addresses, roles, and any associated private records in approved storage. # What to carry into the next module Identify the operations owner and the registry that describe the wallets you are responsible for. In the risk module, you will use each wallet's purpose and authority to choose its classification. Your course answers are learning evidence. The organization's current ownership record, registry, and completed reviews are separate implementation evidence.24:T1f2f,# Decide what a compromise could affect A wallet's balance is only part of its risk. A nearly empty multisig may control a protocol upgrade, pause function, or valuable treasury. Start with the registry, then consider the authority each wallet can exercise. This lesson adapts [SFC Multisig Operations v1.1](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/security-alliance/frameworks/develop/docs/pages/certs/sfc-multisig-ops.mdx), revised April 17, 2026, controls ms-2.1.1 through ms-2.1.4. Use fictional data in course exercises. Keep your organization's actual risk decisions and evidence in approved storage. ## ms-2.1.1: Classify multisigs and map their controls Classify every multisig using both impact and operational needs. Impact includes financial exposure, protocol criticality, and reputational risk. Operational needs include required response time and coordination complexity. A wallet that must act urgently needs a different coordination plan from a treasury that usually makes planned transfers. Urgency does not remove the minimum signer requirements. For each classification, define specific required controls, including signing thresholds, quorum composition, and review cadence. Quorum composition means which combination of signers can approve an action, not just how many addresses appear in the wallet. Higher-risk classifications require stronger controls, including more signers and higher thresholds. The checklist does not prescribe a universal asset-value boundary or one threshold for every classification. Your organization must define those choices and explain them. Every multisig must have at least 3 distinct signers and a signing threshold of 50% or greater. Distinct people matter; one person holding three keys is not three distinct signers. For an odd number of signers, round the required signature count up so it reaches at least half. A 2-of-3 arrangement meets the numerical minimum; 2-of-5 does not. These examples are arithmetic checks, not approval of a particular deployment. Avoid N-of-N configurations because one unavailable signer can block action. Review classifications every 6 months and after significant changes, including TVL shifts, new products, protocol upgrades, and security incidents. A scheduled review is not a reason to ignore a material change today. For example, your organization's low-balance upgrade multisig can replace core protocol logic. The team evaluates protocol criticality and reputational consequences alongside financial exposure. Its classification specifies the threshold, required signer mix, and review cadence. A new product launch triggers another classification review even if the wallet balance stays small. Preparation task. Make a fictional classification record with impact factors, response needs, coordination constraints, required threshold, quorum composition, and review cadence. Check the signer count and threshold, then set a 6-month review and list change events that trigger an earlier one. For the real organization, locate the approved classification policy and compare each registry entry with it. ## ms-2.1.2: Limit damage with contract controls Select contract-level controls for each multisig according to its classification. Where applicable, implement timelocks, modules, guards, address whitelisting, invariant enforcement, and parameter bounds. These controls can limit the actions available to a compromised quorum, but each must match the wallet's purpose. - A timelock delays an action so others have time to detect and respond. - A module can provide a restricted execution path, but may also introduce authority outside ordinary signing. - A guard can check conditions before allowing an action. - Address whitelisting limits destinations or counterparties. - Invariant enforcement rejects actions that violate required system properties. - Parameter bounds keep changes within defined limits. Require a security review before enabling any module or guard. A familiar product name or an urgent request is not a substitute. Document your decisions, including why you did not implement a control. The source says 'where applicable'; it does not require every listed mechanism on every wallet. That qualifier calls for a reasoned decision, not a silent omission. Suppose your organization wants to add a spending module to its operations wallet. The team first reviews the module's authority and restrictions, then records the decision for that wallet's classification. If a timelock conflicts with the wallet's required emergency response, the team documents why it is not used and which protections remain. Preparation task. For a fictional wallet, consider all six mechanisms and record whether each applies and why. Include the security-review gate for modules and guards. In your organization, locate the decisions and completed reviews for enabled controls; a draft decision matrix alone does not show implementation. ## ms-2.1.3: Approve and track policy exceptions An exception permits a specific, time-bounded departure from policy. Record its justification, expiry date, compensating controls, and remediation plan. Track it so the team can see whether remediation happens before expiry rather than allowing a temporary workaround to become permanent. Critical-class exceptions require approval from an executive or security lead. Approval alone does not replace the four required pieces of documentation. Nor does writing down an exception automatically establish that an assessor will accept the organization's controls. For example, your organization requests a temporary departure from its normal signer-composition policy while recruiting a replacement. Its record identifies the affected Critical-class wallet, explains the need, names compensating controls, sets an expiry date, and describes how the replacement will restore policy compliance. An executive or security lead must approve it. A chat message saying 'fine for now' is insufficient. Preparation task. Draft a fictional exception with all four required fields and the Critical-class approval route. For real preparation, find the active exception register, verify approvals, and check expiry and remediation status with the responsible owner. ## ms-2.1.4: Separate wallets to limit a compromise Distribute assets across multiple wallets to reduce the loss from a single compromise. Choose segregation based on asset value, operational needs, and risk tolerance. Hot/cold separation and treasury distribution across multiple wallets are examples, not a universal allocation formula. Your organization might keep only the funds needed for near-term operations in an active wallet while distributing longer-term treasury assets across other wallets. The team must decide what it can tolerate losing and how quickly it needs each pool. Keeping almost everything in one frequently used wallet defeats the intended containment. Evaluate shared dependencies when explaining the benefit. If the same compromised keys or unrestricted contract authority can drain every wallet, merely adding wallet addresses may offer little protection against that compromise. This is a risk-analysis question, not a source requirement for a fixed percentage split or a prescribed wallet count. Preparation task. Sketch a fictional asset allocation that identifies wallet purposes, values, operational needs, and the impact of one wallet being compromised. For organizational preparation, compare the approved segregation rationale with actual holdings and permissions, and keep that evidence in approved storage. # Prepare a defensible risk decision A classification label without its required controls tells signers little. Bring together the classification policy, contract-control decisions, exception records, and segregation rationale. Course questions test whether you can reason about these decisions; actual configurations and maintained records show what your organization has implemented.25:T2f96,# Prepare the people and devices behind the addresses A multisig address list does not prove that the intended people control the keys, that recovery will work, or that signers can review a transaction safely. This module turns those questions into preparation tasks. Use fictional identities and records in course exercises. Never enter seed phrases, private keys, recovery materials, credentials, or real contact lists here. This lesson adapts [SFC Multisig Operations v1.1](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/security-alliance/frameworks/develop/docs/pages/certs/sfc-multisig-ops.mdx), revised April 17, 2026, controls ms-3.1.1 through ms-3.1.8. Keep real evidence in organization-approved storage. Completing this lesson or its quiz does not verify your address, assess your practical skills, or authorize you to sign. ## ms-3.1.1: Verify the intended signer's address Verify that each signer address belongs to the intended person. The process must include signing a message with that address, verifying the signature through an independent tool, and keeping documented proof of verification. Copying an address from a chat or seeing it on a device does not complete this process. Use the organization's approved process to connect the intended person's identity to the proof of key control. A signature proves control of an address, but the surrounding identity check establishes whose address it is. Use an explicit verification message rather than an unexplained request from someone claiming to onboard you. A message-signing check is not approval of an unrelated transaction. For example, your organization's owner verifies Mina's identity, asks her to sign the agreed verification message using her proposed signer address, checks it with an independent tool, and records the address, verification result, and relevant proof. The onboarding chat's own success banner is not an independent check. Preparation task. With fictional data, outline the identity check, message-signing step, independent verification tool, and proof record. In an approved organizational session, perform the actual verification and store the proof there. Do not treat a course answer as that proof. ## ms-3.1.2: Use dedicated keys on hardware wallets Hardware wallets are required for all multisig operations. Each signer must use a fresh, dedicated address for each multisig, exclusively for that multisig's operations. Do not reuse a personal trading address or one signer address across several multisigs. Different labels for the same address do not create separate keys. Hardware custody does not remove the need to understand what you sign. Use the transaction-review process as well as the hardware requirements in ms-3.1.6. Suppose Mina signs for both your organization's treasury and its upgrade wallet. She needs a fresh, dedicated signer address for each, rather than adding her everyday software-wallet address to both. Each address must remain exclusive to its own multisig's operations. Preparation task. Draft a fictional assignment table with a separate dedicated address for each signer and multisig. For your organization, check address reuse and hardware custody under the approved key-management process. Record the result without recording secrets in this platform. ## ms-3.1.3: Protect recovery materials against several kinds of loss Never store seed phrases digitally, in cloud storage, or in photographs. An encrypted file is still digital storage; a photo in a private album is still a photograph. Keep recovery materials offline under the approved recovery procedure. A backup plan must meet three different needs: - Geographic distribution protects against a disaster affecting one location. - No single point of compromise protects against theft. Separate locations alone are insufficient if one stolen credential or one compromised custodian exposes everything. - Recovery remains possible if one operator is unavailable. Do not make one person's availability the only path to recovery. More copies are not automatically safer. A backup may survive a fire yet still allow a thief to recover the key, or be unreachable when its sole operator is unavailable. Evaluate the whole recovery arrangement rather than checking only that a backup exists. Preparation task. Draw a fictional recovery plan without any seed words. Identify locations, custody and access arrangements, and how authorized recovery works if an operator is unavailable. Test the plan on paper against a regional disaster, theft at one location, and operator loss. In your organization, review actual arrangements through approved secure procedures; retain a non-secret record of the review in approved storage, never copies of recovery material here. ## ms-3.1.4: Manage onboarding, offboarding, and key-control reviews Define how signers are added, removed, and periodically verified. Before adding a signer, connect the address verification, key standards, training, and authorization steps rather than relying on a name in a chat. Remove offboarded signers within the window for the multisig's classification: - Emergency-class multisigs: 48-72 hours. - Critical-class multisigs: 7 days. - Other multisigs: 14 days. These windows depend on the wallet's classification, not the departing signer's job title. A signer on several wallets may therefore need removal on different schedules. These are routine offboarding windows, not permission to wait after a suspected key compromise. A compromise needs the emergency playbook and escalation immediately. Conduct access reviews quarterly and confirm that every signer still controls their key. A current employment roster alone does not establish key control. Use the approved verification process and record the outcome. Reflect security-critical signer changes in the registry within 24 hours as taught in ms-1.1.2. Preparation task. Create a fictional departure checklist for a signer on Emergency-class, Critical-class, and other wallets. Mark each removal window and a separate path for compromise. Draft a quarterly review record that includes confirmation of each signer's key control. For your organization, locate the lifecycle procedure and latest completed review. ## ms-3.1.5: Train and assess before authorizing signing Signers need training and assessment before they are authorized to sign. Training must cover transaction verification, emergency procedures, and phishing and social engineering awareness. Include a practical skills assessment. A multiple-choice result is not a practical assessment. Under the organization's approved process, a candidate should demonstrate the required skills in a controlled setting. For example, they can review a harmless test transaction, explain discrepancies, refuse a suspicious signing request, and walk through the relevant emergency escalation. Those are preparation examples, not a replacement for the organization's assessment criteria or an assessor's evidence decision. Do not use live treasury funds as a course exercise. Provide annual refreshers and training updates within 30 days of significant procedure changes. A new signing workflow should not remain untrained until the next annual session. Communication-compromise procedures also need training; their annual response test is a separate activity covered in the communications module. Preparation task. Build a fictional assessment plan covering transaction review, emergencies, and social engineering, with observed practical tasks and a record of the result. Schedule the annual refresher and identify who issues updates within 30 days of significant changes. For actual authorization, complete the approved assessment and approval process and retain its evidence in approved storage. This course does not perform that authorization or attest that the assessment happened. ## ms-3.1.6: Set hardware wallet capability and procurement standards Define and enforce hardware standards. Required capabilities include an adequate display, clear signing support, PIN security, and firmware integrity verification. A device must let the signer understand the supported signing action. Do not approve an opaque request merely because a hardware wallet protects the key. Buy through a verified supply chain, directly from the manufacturer or an authorized reseller, and verify device authenticity. A sealed-looking package from an unverified seller is not sufficient. Procurement and authenticity checks matter separately from checking features on a product page. For example, your organization chooses a device that supports the signing workflow and records its display, clear-signing, PIN, and firmware-verification requirements. It sources the device through a verified channel and performs the approved authenticity check before use. A marketplace bargain that skips those checks does not meet the standard. Preparation task. Create a fictional acceptance checklist covering all four capability requirements, verified procurement, and authenticity verification. For a real device, apply the organization's checks and keep a non-secret acceptance record. Never record the device PIN or recovery materials in course answers. ## ms-3.1.7: Enforce a secure signing environment Document and enforce security requirements for the devices used in signing operations. A policy that nobody applies is not an implemented control. Your organization's requirements should identify what makes a device acceptable and how operators confirm that it meets those requirements. For high-value operations, use dedicated signing devices or network isolation. The source allows either approach; it does not require both for every operation. A hardware wallet alone does not show that its connected computer or signing environment meets the documented standards. Suppose your organization proposes a high-value transfer while Mina is using an everyday laptop with unrelated work open. She should use the approved dedicated signing device or the approved network-isolation arrangement, and confirm that documented device security requirements are met before proceeding. Preparation task. Draft a fictional pre-signing environment check and identify the dedicated-device or network-isolation option for a high-value operation. In your organization, find the enforced device standard and verify the approved environment through its normal process. Keep non-secret evidence of that check in approved storage. ## ms-3.1.8: Diversify signers against shared failures Distribute signers across roles, entities, and geographies so that a single event cannot compromise quorum. Scale diversity requirements with the multisig's classification. A list of different people is not enough if the same employer account system, local disaster, or organizational pressure can affect enough of them to authorize an action. For example, five signers may all work in one office for one entity. The numerical threshold may pass the minimum, but the composition still exposes the wallet to correlated events. Compare role, entity, and geographic concentrations against the quorum and the classification's diversity requirements. Higher-risk classifications need a correspondingly stronger diversity plan. The checklist does not prescribe one universal country count or external-signer percentage. Preparation task. Build a fictional signer matrix showing role, entity, and geography, then identify which single events could affect quorum. Compare it with the classification policy and propose a composition that meets that policy. In your organization, retain the approved diversity review in restricted storage without sharing real personal or emergency contact details here. # Ready for supervised preparation, not automatic authorization Collect non-secret pointers to the approved verification, key-management, recovery, lifecycle, training, device, and diversity records. Complete practical tasks only through approved organizational processes. Knowledge checks help you spot missing controls; current records, secure arrangements, demonstrated skills, and explicit authorization establish what happened outside the course.26:T2152,# Review the transaction you will actually sign This lesson prepares signers and operations owners for the operational procedures in [SEAL SFC Multisig Operations v1.1, revised 2026-04-17](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/security-alliance/frameworks/develop/docs/pages/certs/sfc-multisig-ops.mdx). The source controls define the requirements; the examples below show how to prepare your organization's procedures and evidence. ## Before the reuse exercises The six following transaction exercises are restricted training fixtures. Some use a 2-of-2 multisig, software-only signing, or blind signing to expose review failures. A 2-of-2 configuration is not a compliant organizational deployment: the source requires at least three distinct signers and a threshold of at least 50%, and says to avoid N-of-N. Hardware wallets are required for all organizational multisig operations. Software-wallet fixtures do not waive that requirement. None of these six fixtures provides an independent transaction-hash verifier. Agreement between a Safe screen and the connected wallet or hardware device is not independent hash verification across two interfaces. Even the clear-payment exercise teaches only part of the review workflow. Do not treat an exercise's completion as proof that you independently verified a transaction. In blind-signing cases, stop or reject rather than authorize unreadable data. In your organization, use the approved independent verification workflow before signing. These exercises teach review decisions, not compliant deployment or signer authorization. ## ms-4.1.1: Define the transaction handling process Document the complete sequence, including who is authorized to initiate a proposal, how approval works, when to simulate it, who executes it, and how the team confirms the result. A message saying "the finance lead approved it" does not replace the approval step or each signer's review. Before signing, every signer independently checks the actual transaction: - The chain ID identifies the intended network. - The target is the contract or address being called. For a token transfer, that target is commonly the token contract, while the recipient and amount are inside calldata. - The calldata specifies the actual function, arguments, recipient, permissions, and any batched calls. Decode it and compare it with the authorized intent. - The value is the native asset sent with the call, not necessarily the token amount in calldata. - The nonce identifies the intended transaction in the multisig's sequence. - The operation type distinguishes CALL from DELEGATECALL. Cross-check the transaction hash across at least two independent interfaces. Use independently derived transaction data and an approved verifier, rather than copying one screen's hash into another or comparing two views fed by the same signing flow. A matching hash does not make an unwanted transaction safe; you still need to understand and approve every detail. A mismatch or unreadable detail means stop and resolve it before signing. DELEGATECALL to an untrusted address is high risk because the target's code runs in the caller's context and can change the multisig's state. Do not mistake it for an ordinary payment because its summary shows a familiar amount. Flag it and follow the high-risk review process. Large transfers, emergency actions, and protocol changes require elevated approval and waiting periods where feasible. Define the thresholds by multisig classification and review them periodically. The source does not prescribe a universal transfer amount or waiting period. Urgency does not remove independent verification or elevated approval. Document how the applicable procedure handles a case where waiting is not feasible. Use private transaction submission when appropriate to prevent front-running or MEV extraction. Decide whether public exposure creates that risk for the proposed action and follow the approved submission method. Private submission does not replace simulation, review, or confirmation. After execution, check the on-chain receipt and resulting state against the approved intent. For example, your organization proposes a token payment. Its summary shows the expected recipient, but decoded calldata contains a different recipient. The signer stops, records the mismatch, and asks for a corrected proposal. Another signer's approval and a matching display do not fix the payload. Preparation task: With the operations owner, write a workflow for one routine payment and one high-risk protocol change. Name the authorized roles, independent verification interfaces, simulation and confirmation steps, classification-based approval and waiting rules, and submission choice. Keep sample verification evidence in approved organizational storage. Do not perform a live transfer or upload keys to complete this lesson. ## ms-4.1.2: Keep transaction audit trails Retain records of all transaction reviews, approvals, and executions for three years. Each record includes the proposer, approvers, verification evidence, timestamps, and issues encountered. A transaction hash alone cannot show who reviewed a payload or why a discrepancy was resolved. Capture the review history, including rejected or corrected proposals, so the record explains the eventual execution. Your organization's corrected payment record should connect the authorized request, independent verification evidence, approval times, simulation outcome, execution, and on-chain confirmation. It should also preserve the original recipient mismatch and its resolution. Protect these records in the organization's approved storage rather than pasting operational evidence into the training platform. Preparation task: Create a transaction-record template containing every required field. Identify the storage owner and how records remain available for three years. Populate the template with a fictional or appropriately sanitized review, then have the operations owner check that it explains the decision. ## ms-4.1.3: Evaluate tools before adoption Use a formal process to adopt new tools and platforms. Evaluate whether each tool is open source or has audits by at least two reputable firms. This is an alternative, not a rule that every open-source tool must also have two audits. In either case, also check that it has no known critical unpatched vulnerabilities and has established ecosystem adoption. A popular tool with an unresolved critical vulnerability does not pass those checks. An audit report or public repository is evidence to review, not automatic approval. Record how the proposed tool meets the evaluation criteria and obtain the organization's formal adoption decision before using it for multisig operations. Apply the same process to alternate tools you may need during an outage. Preparation task: Draft an evaluation for the primary signing UI and one verification tool. Include the open-source status or two reputable audit sources, the known critical vulnerability status, ecosystem adoption evidence, and the formal adoption decision. A link supplied in an urgent chat is not a substitute for this process. ## ms-4.1.4: Prepare backup signing infrastructure Maintain an alternate signing UI, two to three backup RPC providers, and an alternate block explorer. These cover different failures: the UI may be unavailable, the RPC may return stale data or fail, and the explorer may be down. Having only another explorer does not give you an alternate signing UI. Two bookmarks for the same RPC provider do not provide two backup providers. Document the approved fallback choices before an outage. Signers still need to verify the chain, payload, nonce, operation, and independent hashes when using a fallback. An outage is not a reason to install an unknown signing tool or skip review. Preparation task: Inventory the alternate UI, two to three backup RPC providers, and alternate explorer for the networks you use. Confirm with the owner that the team can access the approved options and explain the switch procedure. Plan any real fallback exercise through the organization; this quiz does not test your infrastructure. After this lesson, the reused challenges let you practice spotting payload mismatches and refusing blind signing. Passing them records simulated decisions, not the organization's transaction controls. Keep the workflow, review templates, tool decisions, and infrastructure inventory for the organizational evidence handoff at the end of the course.27:T50a,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:T50a,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:T50a,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:T14fe,# Coordinate without trusting a compromised channel This lesson covers communication and coordination in [SEAL SFC Multisig Operations v1.1, revised 2026-04-17](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/security-alliance/frameworks/develop/docs/pages/certs/sfc-multisig-ops.mdx). It prepares signers and operations owners to organize real procedures and evidence. The lesson and chat challenge are knowledge and decision practice, not a live test of your organization's channels. ## ms-5.1.1: Establish secure communication procedures Maintain dedicated primary and backup multisig channels on different platforms. Both need end-to-end encryption, required multi-factor authentication, and invitation-based membership. A second room on the primary platform is not a backup platform. Encryption alone does not establish a participant's identity or protect a channel whose authorized account has been taken over. Verify signer identity as a standard procedure during signing operations, not only when a message looks suspicious. Document the approved method, such as code words, a video call, or a secondary authenticated channel. A familiar name, avatar, or message history does not establish who currently controls an account. Use identity verification together with transaction verification; passing one does not replace the other. Document the channel-compromise response before an incident. Include how the team stops trusting the affected channel, switches to the established backup channel, and verifies participants out of band. Use previously verified contact routes. Do not accept a replacement-channel link or a new verification method solely because it appeared in the channel suspected of compromise. For example, someone using your operations lead's account posts an urgent approval request and asks signers to join a new chat. A signer notices that the message bypasses the usual identity check. The team pauses coordination through the suspect channel, reaches the lead through a previously authenticated route, and uses its documented backup-platform procedure. It does not resolve the doubt by asking the same possibly compromised account to confirm itself. Train all signers on these procedures, including how to verify identities and switch channels. Test the compromise response annually. Training attendance and an annual response test are different evidence: knowing the procedure does not show that the team can reach the backup channel and authenticate participants when the primary channel is unavailable or untrusted. Preparation task: With the operations owner, record the primary and backup platforms, their encryption and MFA settings, invitation controls, the standard identity-check method, and the compromise-response steps. Identify how every signer will receive training. Schedule the annual compromise-response test with the real team and preserve the result in approved organizational storage. This course's chat scenario is a rehearsal of your decision, not that annual test. ## ms-5.1.2: Maintain emergency contacts Keep a current emergency contact list for all multisig stakeholders. Include the protocol security team, external security resources, legal and compliance contacts, and backup contacts for signers. External resources may be an incident-response partner or another security resource your organization has chosen. Define usable contact routes before they are urgently needed. Include a personal emergency contact for each signer, such as a trusted family member or close colleague, for situations where normal channels cannot reach the signer. This person can help locate the signer. Listing a personal contact does not authorize that person to sign, disclose recovery materials, or bypass quorum. A signer's alternate work account alone does not satisfy this personal-contact requirement. Review the contact list every six months. Confirm that the people, roles, and contact routes remain current, including external and backup contacts. A list that was accurate when the multisig was created may fail when an employee leaves or an incident-response partner changes. The six-month contact review is separate from annual channel-compromise testing and quarterly reachability testing covered in the emergency lesson. For example, your organization's review finds that its security partner's on-call number changed and one signer has no trusted personal contact recorded. The owner updates those entries and checks the remaining contacts rather than treating a recent successful chat exchange as a review of the whole list. Preparation task: The operations owner should review the real list in the organization's approved storage, fill missing stakeholder and signer contact categories, and record the review date and next six-month review. Check how authorized responders can access it when the normal channel fails. Do not paste contact lists, personal phone numbers, code words, seeds, or private keys into this platform. Record only a safe evidence reference for the eventual organizational handoff. The next chat challenge asks you to choose a safe response to suspected channel compromise. Passing it does not prove end-to-end encryption, MFA enforcement, membership controls, trained signers, a completed annual team test, or a current contact list. Those require actual organizational preparation and evidence.2b:T27d1,# Prepare the team before an emergency This final lesson covers emergency operations in [SEAL SFC Multisig Operations v1.1, revised 2026-04-17](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/security-alliance/frameworks/develop/docs/pages/certs/sfc-multisig-ops.mdx). Across the six modules, you have studied all 24 controls. Now separate what you learned from what your organization can demonstrate. The emergency case and knowledge checks let you practice decisions. They cannot page real signers, test production monitoring, or rehearse your team's response. ## ms-6.1.1: Write accessible emergency playbooks Maintain step-by-step playbooks for key compromise, lost access, communication channel compromise, and urgent protocol actions. Each scenario needs its own procedures and escalation paths. A generic instruction to "contact security" does not tell a responder what to do next or who takes over if the first contact is unavailable. Name the response roles and approved decision path. For key compromise, use the emergency response rather than waiting for a routine offboarding deadline. For lost access, distinguish an unavailable signer from evidence that an attacker controls a key. For channel compromise, use the established backup platform and out-of-band identity checks. For an urgent protocol action, preserve authorized approval and transaction verification while using the applicable high-risk procedure. Work with the security team to specify the actual containment and recovery steps for the organization's contracts and authority. Do not improvise live actions from a fictional quiz. Make playbooks accessible through at least one backup method independent of the primary documentation platform. Another page in the same document service is not independent. An approved offline copy or a separately hosted copy may provide access when the primary service fails, provided authorized responders can use it and the owner keeps it current. Preparation task: With the operations and security owners, review all four scenario playbooks. Confirm the procedures, escalation contacts, and who can authorize each action. Identify the independent backup access method and have authorized responders locate the current copy. Keep the real playbooks and access evidence in approved organizational storage, not in this course. ## ms-6.1.2: Reach quorum at any time The team must be able to reach enough signers to meet quorum at any time, including outside business hours. The source's response times by classification are: | Classification | Response time | | --- | --- | | Emergency | Less than 2 hours | | Time-Sensitive | 2-12 hours | | Routine | 24-48 hours | Use the classification that applies to the multisig. A response at exactly two hours does not meet the Emergency requirement. Reaching one person does not prove quorum reachability; the response plan must reach enough eligible signers for the configured threshold. A reachable signer still follows identity checks and transaction verification before signing. Paging must cover all signers, including external parties. Document escalation paths so responders know whom to contact next when someone does not respond. Test reachability quarterly, including the arrangements needed outside business hours. A list of valid phone numbers or a solo simulated paging decision is not a quarterly test of real quorum reachability. For example, your organization's Emergency-class multisig needs three signers. Two respond promptly, but the third is an external signer omitted from paging. Even if the missing signer eventually replies after two hours, the arrangement has not demonstrated the required quorum response within less than two hours. The owner needs to fix coverage and escalation. Preparation task: Map the configured threshold to a paging and escalation plan covering every signer, including external parties. Arrange the actual quarterly reachability test with the team, measure responses and whether quorum was reachable within the applicable window, and keep the results. Do not ask learners to page real contacts as part of this quiz. ## ms-6.1.3: Monitor multisigs and protect alerts Monitor every multisig for unauthorized or suspicious activity. The source requires coverage of all these event categories: - Signer or threshold changes. - Transfers exceeding the applicable thresholds. - Nonce gaps. - Interactions with unknown addresses. - Failed transactions. - Module or guard changes. - Low submitter or proposer balances. Use the organization's applicable transfer thresholds; the source does not set one universal amount. Failed transactions and low balances matter because they may prevent an urgent action from executing, even when no funds have been stolen. A module or guard change can alter the multisig's authority or protections without looking like a transfer. Document the alerting and escalation paths. Specify who receives each alert and what to do if that responder is unavailable. Protect the monitoring infrastructure against tampering so an attacker cannot quietly disable rules, modify destinations, or suppress notifications. Use the organization's approved access controls and change records, and review how the team detects unauthorized monitoring changes. For example, your organization sees an unexpected guard change while the submitter balance is too low to execute a response. Both events need review and escalation; neither is harmless just because no large transfer alert fired. Respond through the applicable playbook and authorized review process rather than signing an unverified "rescue" transaction from an alert message. Preparation task: Build a coverage table for each multisig with every event category, its configured rule, recipient, escalation path, and evidence reference. Have the monitoring owner demonstrate the tamper protections and approve a safe way to check alert delivery. Do not manufacture suspicious production transactions for this lesson. ## ms-6.1.4: Rehearse and improve emergency procedures Run emergency drills at least annually and after major procedure changes. The latter requirement does not wait for the next annual date. Plan a real team rehearsal that exercises the relevant roles and procedures without making unsafe production changes. The organization can use an approved simulated incident, but the real team must practice its response; an individual online scenario is not the team drill. Document the date, participants, response times, issues identified, and improvements made. A calendar invitation proves scheduling, not participation or a tested response. Record what actually happened. If a backup playbook was inaccessible or paging missed an external signer, name the problem, assign its resolution, and preserve the changes made. Do not describe proposed improvements as completed work. Preparation task: Review the latest annual drill record and whether any major procedure change needs a new drill. With the owner, arrange the needed team rehearsal, record its timing and participants, and track issues through actual improvements. Keep those records in approved organizational storage. ## Evidence handoff and course completion Before an assessment, signers and the operations owner should assemble an evidence index covering all 24 source control IDs. Use references to approved organizational storage rather than uploading operational material here. The index should distinguish the written procedure, the real control or configuration, evidence of its use or test, its owner, the relevant date, and unresolved gaps. Include documented exceptions with their justification, expiry, compensating controls, remediation plan, and required approval where applicable. An index entry is not proof by itself. Gather the work prepared across the course: - Governance ownership, the multisig registry, classification decisions, contract-control reviews, exceptions, and wallet segregation. - Signer verification proof, hardware and key-management standards, protected recovery arrangements, lifecycle and access reviews, practical assessment and training records, secure signing environments, and signer diversity. - The transaction workflow, independent verification evidence, three-year transaction records, tool-adoption decisions, and the alternate UI, two to three backup RPC providers, and alternate explorer. - Secure primary and backup channel settings, standard identity checks, signer communication training, the annual compromise-response test, and the contact-list review. - Scenario playbooks with independent backup access, quarterly reachability tests, monitoring coverage and tamper protections, and annual or post-change drill records with improvements. Check the different clocks rather than combining them into one annual checkbox. Emergency contacts are reviewed every six months. Reachability is tested quarterly. Channel-compromise response is tested annually. Emergency drills run at least annually and after major procedure changes. These are separate organizational activities; passing this course completes none of those tests or drills. Do not submit seed phrases, private keys, recovery materials, personal contact lists, or sensitive live incident details to this platform. Recovery evidence should describe and demonstrate the approved protection and recovery process without exposing secrets. An authorized assessment may require sensitive evidence, but share it only through the organization's agreed secure process. Course completion records knowledge checks and simulated decisions. It is not SEAL certification, proof that the organization meets the controls, or permission to sign. Signer authorization still requires the organization's process and practical skills assessment before authorization. The assessor decides whether the organizational evidence is sufficient; this course does not decide that, and the source does not say the assessor must personally witness every task. Hand off the evidence index and unresolved gaps to the operations owner and assessor through the approved process. That handoff, not a quiz result, supports assessment of the real organization.2c:T126b,Operations incident MS-041

Unresolved incident

Operations / incident MS-041

Snapshot at 02:20 UTC. Suspected signer change detected at 02:10 UTC. No containment or recovery action recorded.

1. Alert and monitoring evidence

Observed signal	An external watcher reported an unexpected owner-change event for the emergency multisig.
Verification status	Report not yet independently confirmed. Primary frontend and its transaction summary are treated as untrusted.
Monitoring health	The primary monitor stopped sending alerts at 02:12 UTC. Its configuration-change log shows collection disabled.
Other findings	Two failed transactions and a low proposer balance were recorded before the monitor stopped.
Available evidence	Independent watcher notification and retained pre-outage logs. Preserve timestamps and investigate monitor tampering.

2. Signer reachability and backup infrastructure

Approved configuration	Five distinct signers; threshold three. Emergency-class wallet with role, entity and geographic diversity.
Current paging status	One signer acknowledged. Four have not acknowledged, including two external signers. Quorum is not established.
Response requirement	Reach enough signers for Emergency-class response in less than two hours. This snapshot is ten minutes after detection.
Known weak point	Last quarterly reachability test did not include the external signers.
Approved backups	Alternate signing UI, three independently administered RPC providers and an alternate block explorer. The roster lists verified primary and backup contacts.

Do not lower the threshold or use an unapproved signing route to compensate for missing acknowledgments.

3. Playbook and communication records

The key-compromise playbook specifies trusted escalation, independent chain-state verification and approved containment actions.
A separate, authenticated backup documentation store holds the playbook. The primary documentation platform is unreachable.
The incident channel has a pre-established encrypted backup on a different platform, with MFA and invitation-based membership.
Security leadership, external security resources, legal/compliance and signer backup contacts are listed in the approved roster.
A pre-prepared pause proposal exists, but its payload, authorization and current chain state have not yet been checked. Preparation is not approval to execute.

4. Previous drill and improvement record

The last rehearsal says only: All participants completed a dashboard quiz. It contains no paging results, quorum response times, executed response steps, issues or tracked improvements.

A real rehearsal must exercise the approved procedure and record date, participants, response times, issues and improvements. Hold drills at least annually and after major procedure changes. This individual exercise does not replace that rehearsal.

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A wallet UI shows 'address added,' but no verification message was signed. Which steps belong in the process to verify the intended signer? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"Have Mina sign a verification message with the proposed signer address.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Verify the message signature using an independent tool.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Keep documented proof that connects the verified address to the intended person.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Treat the chat avatar and the wallet UI's added-address banner as sufficient verification.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"Mina will sign for your organization's treasury and upgrade multisigs. She proposes using her existing personal trading address on a software wallet for both. Which requirements must her setup meet? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"Use hardware wallets for all multisig operations.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use a fresh, dedicated signer address per multisig, exclusively for that multisig's operations.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Reuse the personal trading address for both multisigs once it is moved onto hardware.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use hardware only for large transfers and a software wallet for routine multisig operations.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"A signer stores seed photos in encrypted cloud storage and keeps an offline copy in one office safe that only they can access. Which requirements must the recovery redesign meet? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"Keep seed phrases out of digital files, cloud storage, and photographs.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Distribute backups geographically for disaster resistance.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Avoid a single point of compromise for theft resistance.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Keep recovery possible if one operator is unavailable.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Retain encrypted seed photos as a safe exception to the digital-storage restriction.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"A departing contractor signs for an Emergency-class wallet, a Critical-class wallet, and another wallet. Which routine offboarding schedule follows the checklist?","answers":[{"text":"Use 14 days for every wallet because the signer is a contractor rather than an executive.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use 7 days for every wallet because one of the wallets is Critical-class.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Remove them only after the next quarterly access review confirms their departure.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use 48-72 hours for the Emergency-class wallet, 7 days for the Critical-class wallet, and 14 days for the other wallet; review access quarterly and confirm key control.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"During an access review, a signer reports that their hardware wallet and recovery materials may have been stolen. An owner proposes waiting 7 days because the multisig is Critical-class. What is the appropriate response?","answers":[{"text":"Use the key-compromise emergency playbook and escalate now rather than treating routine offboarding windows as permission to wait.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Wait 7 days, because classification deadlines apply to both departures and active compromise.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Wait for the next quarterly review so the team can confirm whether the thief used the key.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Ask the signer to upload recovery photos to this platform to establish proof of loss.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Mina passes this course. Your organization also changes its signing procedure substantially this week. Which actions satisfy signer-training requirements? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"Complete training on transaction verification, emergency procedures, and phishing and social engineering, plus a practical skills assessment before signer authorization.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Schedule annual refresher training.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Provide training updates within 30 days of the significant procedure change.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Treat the course score as practical-assessment proof and authorize signing without the organization's assessment process.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"Your organization's procurement checklist says only 'hardware wallet, sealed box.' Which requirements belong in the replacement checklist? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"Require an adequate display and clear signing support.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Require PIN security and firmware integrity verification.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Procure directly from the manufacturer or an authorized reseller through a verified supply chain.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Verify device authenticity.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Accept a sealed box from an unverified seller instead of checking authenticity and capabilities.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"Mina has an approved hardware wallet but is about to sign a high-value operation from an everyday computer that has not met your organization's device policy. What should she do?","answers":[{"text":"Proceed because hardware custody alone makes every connected computer an acceptable signing environment.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Meet the documented and enforced device-security requirements, and use dedicated signing devices or network isolation for the high-value operation.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Move the key to a software wallet on the same computer to avoid hardware connectivity risks.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use any environment if another signer has already approved the transaction.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Your organization's higher-risk multisig has five distinct signers, all in the same office, role, and entity. Its numerical threshold meets policy. What should the diversity review conclude?","answers":[{"text":"No review is needed because distinct people automatically mean diverse signers.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The checklist requires exactly two countries for every wallet, so geography is the only missing factor.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Giving each signer more addresses solves shared organizational and geographic risk.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Review concentration across roles, entities, and geographies against the classification's diversity requirements so a single event cannot compromise quorum.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false}],"video_url":null,"created_at":"2026-10-07T17:22:32.708578+00:00","created_by":"3424d5b9-9e06-45ee-9650-3e43d28084fb","slides_url":null,"updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:22:32.708578+00:00","visibility":"private","description":"Prepare address verification, dedicated hardware keys, resilient recovery, signer lifecycle reviews, practical assessment, and secure signing environments.","featured_image":null}}]},{"id":"c01d4d35-b573-4341-8463-f552fb790554","title":"Operational procedures","position":3,"created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","description":"Learn the full verification process, then practice narrow Safe and wallet review decisions. Exercise configurations are not compliant deployment examples.","training_id":"6901c285-49c1-4c75-8bda-f03107ce1d96","sections":[{"id":"0b2d6f7c-1ed4-4a5b-a674-9f6c4262eeba","position":0,"module_id":"c01d4d35-b573-4341-8463-f552fb790554","created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","lessonId":"fa38949d-8070-4997-aa86-f40b3bc9ebc1","quizId":null,"type":"lesson","content":{"id":"fa38949d-8070-4997-aa86-f40b3bc9ebc1","slug":"seal-multisig-transaction-review","type":"text","title":"SEAL multisig transaction review","status":"draft","content":"$26","pdf_url":null,"category":null,"questions":[{"prompt":"Your organization's payment summary lists the intended recipient, but decoded token-transfer calldata names a different recipient. Another signer has approved. What should you do?","answers":[{"text":"Sign because the summary and an existing approval establish the intended payment.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Stop, resolve the payload mismatch, and independently verify the corrected transaction before signing.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Sign if the native value is zero, because the token transfer then moves no assets.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Ask the proposer to repeat the recipient in chat, then sign the unchanged transaction.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"An urgent protocol change uses DELEGATECALL to an unfamiliar target. The team wants to skip elevated approval and publish it immediately. Which response follows the source?","answers":[{"text":"Treat DELEGATECALL like a normal transfer if the device displays the expected amount.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Skip review during emergencies because only routine transactions need independent verification.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Require the same fixed 24-hour wait for every organization and every transaction.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Flag the untrusted DELEGATECALL as high risk, require elevated approval, apply the classification's wait where feasible, and consider private submission if exposure creates front-running or MEV risk.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"You finish a clear-payment fixture with matching Safe and hardware-device displays. Its multisig is 2-of-2, and no independent verifier is available. What does this demonstrate?","answers":[{"text":"Practice reviewing displayed details, but not independent hash verification, compliant signer configuration, or signer authorization.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Compliance because Safe and the connected device count as the two required independent interfaces.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Permission to use 2-of-2 in production whenever both signers have hardware wallets.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Completion of the organization's practical assessment and authorization to sign live transfers.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Your organization stores only the final transaction hash and deletes chat approvals after 90 days. Which changes meet the transaction audit-trail baseline? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"Retain records of all transaction reviews, approvals, and executions for three years.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Include proposer, approvers, verification evidence, timestamps, and issues encountered in the records.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Keep only successful execution receipts because public chain history reconstructs the review.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Delete approvals and verification evidence after the next quarterly review.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"A proposed signing UI is open source and widely used, but it has a known critical unpatched vulnerability. The proposer says open source means it is approved. What should the owner decide?","answers":[{"text":"Adopt it because open-source status overrides vulnerability concerns.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Do not adopt it as meeting the baseline; resolve the critical vulnerability concern and complete the formal evaluation and adoption process.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Adopt it if one reputable auditor reviewed a different version.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use it during outages only, without documenting an adoption decision.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"The owner is reviewing two new tools. Which evaluation correctly applies the source's open-source and audit alternatives?","answers":[{"text":"Every tool needs both open-source code and two reputable audits, regardless of the other criteria.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Closed-source tools qualify with one audit if their vendor is well known.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Two audits allow a tool to be adopted despite a critical unpatched vulnerability.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Evaluate open source or audits by at least two reputable firms, and in either case also evaluate critical unpatched vulnerabilities and ecosystem adoption before formal approval.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"The primary signing UI is unavailable. Your organization has an approved alternate UI and explorer but no backup RPC providers. What is still missing?","answers":[{"text":"Two to three backup RPC providers, with the fallback workflow preserving normal transaction verification.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Nothing; the alternate explorer replaces the need for RPC providers.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"A second bookmark pointing to the same primary RPC endpoint.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Permission to sign blind through the alternate UI until the primary returns.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false}],"video_url":null,"created_at":"2026-10-07T17:22:32.708578+00:00","created_by":"3424d5b9-9e06-45ee-9650-3e43d28084fb","slides_url":null,"updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:22:32.708578+00:00","visibility":"private","description":"Prepare a transaction workflow with independent verification, durable review records, approved tools, and backup signing infrastructure.","featured_image":null}},{"id":"e03cff95-10b2-4e09-9f8d-b9a4bdb949e5","position":1,"module_id":"c01d4d35-b573-4341-8463-f552fb790554","created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","lessonId":null,"quizId":"8140205e-a3fa-40b5-9081-418816fca37f","type":"quiz","content":{"id":"8140205e-a3fa-40b5-9081-418816fca37f","slug":"safe-clear-payment","type":"safe-wallet","title":"Safe: approve a clear ETH payment","status":"draft","content":{"questions":[{"prompt":"Which payment is shown in both Safe and the device's owner approval?","answers":[{"text":"1 ETH to 0xa9b3f5Eb7D170562BE78f54b26637ba4A3d462CE.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"1 DAI to the Operations Safe.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"An unlimited token allowance for Team Vault.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Which additional fields support the interpretation of a direct ETH payment? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"The operation is CALL (0).","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The data is empty (0x).","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The website's familiar appearance proves the payment is intended.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"A Team Vault label makes the full address unnecessary.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"The device fields match Safe. When is adding your owner approval appropriate?","answers":[{"text":"Only after confirming this exact payment is intended and authorized.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Whenever two displays agree, regardless of payment intent.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Never; every Safe owner approval is malicious.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"What would accepting this owner approval change in this exercise? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"The approval count would become 1/2.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The payment would remain unexecuted with unchanged balances.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"1 ETH would be sent as soon as the signature is added.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The Safe's two-owner threshold would already be met.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true}],"safeWallet":{"initialQuery":{"id":"multisig_0xF45afcd8007ff2C99f96Bc20D9caDfc63bc237E5_0xda0ee6875ef738a54eeae037ccf4a9c966ad2ebbd28add4d2bd18a32839a5ad8"},"scenarioConfig":{"ui":{"features":{"switchChain":false,"switchWallet":false,"newTransactions":true,"ownerManagement":false,"transactionQueue":true,"addressBookManagement":false},"signLater":true,"executeNow":false,"walletResultMode":"apply"},"assets":[{"name":"Ether","type":"native","symbol":"ETH","address":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","balance":"9500000000000000000","trusted":true,"decimals":18},{"name":"Dai Stablecoin","type":"erc20","symbol":"DAI","address":"0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F","balance":"910000000000000000000000","trusted":true,"decimals":18}],"wallet":{"name":"Operations Safe","nonce":12,"owners":[{"name":"Operations Signer","address":"0x647cAEBB7D459BeA4019d2455A97e8f9f54004f4"},{"name":"Treasury Signer","address":"0x86A4e17Ac43fb8CaB773C0c6d4B1f1112Fda0Df8"}],"address":"0xF45afcd8007ff2C99f96Bc20D9caDfc63bc237E5","version":"1.4.1","threshold":2,"implementationAddress":"0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a"},"modules":{"enabled":[],"fallbackHandler":{"name":"Compatibility Fallback Handler","address":"0xfd0732Dc9E303f09fCEf3a7388Ad10A83459Ec99"}},"network":{"chainId":"1"},"session":{"activeOwner":"0x647cAEBB7D459BeA4019d2455A97e8f9f54004f4"},"version":"1.0.0","simulation":{"signing":{"allowedSigners":["0x647cAEBB7D459BeA4019d2455A97e8f9f54004f4","0x86A4e17Ac43fb8CaB773C0c6d4B1f1112Fda0Df8"],"denyReasonByTxId":{}},"features":{"ownerManagementTransactions":false},"execution":{"mode":"simulated","outcomeByTxId":{}}},"addressBook":[{"name":"Team Vault","address":"0xa9b3f5Eb7D170562BE78f54b26637ba4A3d462CE"},{"name":"Dai Stablecoin","address":"0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F"}],"scenarioMeta":{"id":"safe-multisig-transfer-review","title":"Safe: approve a clear ETH payment"},"transactions":{"queue":[{"txId":"multisig_0xF45afcd8007ff2C99f96Bc20D9caDfc63bc237E5_0xda0ee6875ef738a54eeae037ccf4a9c966ad2ebbd28add4d2bd18a32839a5ad8","nonce":12,"safeTx":{"to":"0xa9b3f5Eb7D170562BE78f54b26637ba4A3d462CE","data":"0x","value":"1000000000000000000","baseGas":"0","gasPrice":"0","gasToken":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","operation":0,"safeTxGas":"0","refundReceiver":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"},"txInfo":{"type":"Transfer","sender":{"name":"Operations Safe","value":"0xF45afcd8007ff2C99f96Bc20D9caDfc63bc237E5"},"direction":"OUTGOING","recipient":{"name":"Team Vault","value":"0xa9b3f5Eb7D170562BE78f54b26637ba4A3d462CE"},"transferInfo":{"type":"NATIVE_COIN","value":"1000000000000000000"}},"signers":[{"name":"Operations Signer","address":"0x647cAEBB7D459BeA4019d2455A97e8f9f54004f4"},{"name":"Treasury Signer","address":"0x86A4e17Ac43fb8CaB773C0c6d4B1f1112Fda0Df8"}],"trusted":true,"txStatus":"AWAITING_CONFIRMATIONS","timestamp":1762974853000,"safeTxHash":"0xda0ee6875ef738a54eeae037ccf4a9c966ad2ebbd28add4d2bd18a32839a5ad8","submittedAt":1762974853000,"confirmations":[],"advancedDetails":{"json":{"to":"0xa9b3f5Eb7D170562BE78f54b26637ba4A3d462CE","data":"0x","nonce":12,"value":"1000000000000000000","baseGas":"0","gasPrice":"0","gasToken":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","operation":0,"safeTxGas":"0","refundReceiver":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"},"hashes":{"domainHash":"0xd9e9de2a923fe54cc7aa3a2d5817fd04fc586b23a57ab4019393048900f1a043","safeTxHash":"0xda0ee6875ef738a54eeae037ccf4a9c966ad2ebbd28add4d2bd18a32839a5ad8","messageHash":"0x67d3cd8972b2cda663d2d67978b8f9a76f8d20c4adc0d08df9cf091f3ae229b9"}},"confirmationsSubmitted":0}],"history":[{"txId":"multisig_0xF45afcd8007ff2C99f96Bc20D9caDfc63bc237E5_0xd238b9c2811ac39ddfd74da7baddeacd432eb37dc0c795f823e12b4707b9ff56","nonce":0,"safeTx":{"to":"0xF45afcd8007ff2C99f96Bc20D9caDfc63bc237E5","data":"0x","value":"0","baseGas":"0","gasPrice":"0","gasToken":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","operation":0,"safeTxGas":"0","refundReceiver":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"},"txHash":"0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111","txInfo":{"type":"Creation","creator":{"name":"Operations Signer","value":"0x647cAEBB7D459BeA4019d2455A97e8f9f54004f4"},"factory":{"name":"SafeProxyFactory 1.4.1","value":"0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67"},"implementation":{"name":"Safe 1.4.1","value":"0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a"},"transactionHash":"0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111"},"signers":[],"trusted":true,"txStatus":"SUCCESS","timestamp":1719835200000,"executedAt":1719835200000,"safeTxHash":"0xd238b9c2811ac39ddfd74da7baddeacd432eb37dc0c795f823e12b4707b9ff56","submittedAt":1719835200000,"confirmations":[],"advancedDetails":{"json":{"to":"0xF45afcd8007ff2C99f96Bc20D9caDfc63bc237E5","data":"0x","nonce":0,"value":"0","baseGas":"0","gasPrice":"0","gasToken":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","operation":0,"safeTxGas":"0","refundReceiver":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"},"hashes":{"domainHash":"0xd9e9de2a923fe54cc7aa3a2d5817fd04fc586b23a57ab4019393048900f1a043","safeTxHash":"0xd238b9c2811ac39ddfd74da7baddeacd432eb37dc0c795f823e12b4707b9ff56","messageHash":"0xaf900ee6e7b7e79cdcfa770ec7415e76acf84dccffeb27f68a57559bd00ae145"}},"confirmationsSubmitted":0,"confirmationsRequiredAtExecution":1}]}},"initialPathname":"/transactions/tx","walletInteractions":{"sign":{"ui":{"buttonText":"Review owner approval"},"data":{"chainId":1,"message":"{\"domain\":{\"chainId\":1,\"verifyingContract\":\"0xF45afcd8007ff2C99f96Bc20D9caDfc63bc237E5\"},\"types\":{\"EIP712Domain\":[{\"name\":\"chainId\",\"type\":\"uint256\"},{\"name\":\"verifyingContract\",\"type\":\"address\"}],\"SafeTx\":[{\"name\":\"to\",\"type\":\"address\"},{\"name\":\"value\",\"type\":\"uint256\"},{\"name\":\"data\",\"type\":\"bytes\"},{\"name\":\"operation\",\"type\":\"uint8\"},{\"name\":\"safeTxGas\",\"type\":\"uint256\"},{\"name\":\"baseGas\",\"type\":\"uint256\"},{\"name\":\"gasPrice\",\"type\":\"uint256\"},{\"name\":\"gasToken\",\"type\":\"address\"},{\"name\":\"refundReceiver\",\"type\":\"address\"},{\"name\":\"nonce\",\"type\":\"uint256\"}]},\"primaryType\":\"SafeTx\",\"message\":{\"to\":\"0xa9b3f5Eb7D170562BE78f54b26637ba4A3d462CE\",\"value\":\"1000000000000000000\",\"data\":\"0x\",\"operation\":0,\"safeTxGas\":\"0\",\"baseGas\":\"0\",\"gasPrice\":\"0\",\"gasToken\":\"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",\"refundReceiver\":\"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",\"nonce\":12}}","messageType":"typed_data","accountAddress":"0x647cAEBB7D459BeA4019d2455A97e8f9f54004f4"},"kind":"software","type":"signature","deviceConfirmation":{"theme":"ledger","deviceIntelligence":true}}}}},"created_at":"2026-10-07T17:21:37.414552+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:21:37.414552+00:00","visibility":"private","description":"Compare the payment shown in Safe with the owner approval on your hardware wallet. Adding a signature does not execute the payment.","instructions":"Review the payment details in Safe. Click Confirm, then Sign, then Confirm in device. Compare every device page with Safe before accepting or rejecting. This request adds an owner signature; execution is a separate action and is disabled in this exercise."}},{"id":"76a8b3fb-2ba0-47f6-9bee-21455c47290a","position":2,"module_id":"c01d4d35-b573-4341-8463-f552fb790554","created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","lessonId":null,"quizId":"7da6c432-7de1-42d9-9f6d-4c41f44c20bc","type":"quiz","content":{"id":"7da6c432-7de1-42d9-9f6d-4c41f44c20bc","slug":"multisig-token-recipient-mismatch","type":"safe-wallet","title":"Safe: check the DAI receiving address","status":"draft","content":{"questions":[{"prompt":"What does the To address 0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F identify in this approval?","answers":[{"text":"The DAI token contract, not the DAI receiving account.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The Team Vault receiving account.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The owner whose signature is being requested.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Which payment does the device's decoded transfer authorize for later execution?","answers":[{"text":"500,000 DAI to 0x06bD12E2a77195658f9fa61b43498467604770bf.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"500,000 ETH to Team Vault.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"No payment because the ETH value is zero.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Which fields still match between the Safe display and the device approval? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"The DAI token contract.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The 500,000 DAI amount.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"CALL (0) with 0 ETH value.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The DAI receiving account.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"Safe's summary and advanced JSON both show Team Vault. What does comparison with the device establish?","answers":[{"text":"The webpage panels agree with each other but not with the approval's recipient.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The approval must be safe because two webpage panels agree.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Only the token contract differs; the recipient matches.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"What is the appropriate decision after finding this recipient mismatch?","answers":[{"text":"Reject and resolve the mismatch before adding an approval.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Approve because another owner already signed.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Approve because the amount and token contract match.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"If this owner approval were accepted, which consequences would follow? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"The approval count would reach 2/2.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The mismatching DAI transfer would be ready for later execution.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Adding the signature would immediately move 500,000 DAI.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The signature would replace the encoded recipient with Team 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Adding a signature does not execute the payment.","instructions":"Review the payment details in Safe. Click Confirm, then Sign, then Confirm in device. Compare every device page with Safe before accepting or rejecting. This request adds an owner signature; execution is a separate action and is disabled in this exercise."}},{"id":"9662c29a-70d9-4121-b393-14999e70722c","position":3,"module_id":"c01d4d35-b573-4341-8463-f552fb790554","created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","lessonId":null,"quizId":"7c39587d-1200-41cf-9f75-4b7ed9f41d1d","type":"quiz","content":{"id":"7c39587d-1200-41cf-9f75-4b7ed9f41d1d","slug":"hardware-wallet-blind-safe-execution","type":"hardware-wallet","title":"Hardware wallet: unreadable Safe execution","status":"draft","content":{"questions":[{"prompt":"What does the external To address on this hardware wallet identify?","answers":[{"text":"The Safe receiving the external execution transaction.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The account receiving the inner DAI payment.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The DAI token contract.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Which payment details remain unverified by this device display? 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Cancel or reject if it does not."}},{"id":"1e630b42-2261-4499-b839-9421b6aec61a","position":5,"module_id":"c01d4d35-b573-4341-8463-f552fb790554","created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","lessonId":null,"quizId":"45114257-780f-4605-9a7c-53f60869bb78","type":"quiz","content":{"id":"45114257-780f-4605-9a7c-53f60869bb78","slug":"multisig-hardware-blind-signing","type":"safe-wallet","title":"Safe: hardware review of unreadable execution","status":"draft","content":{"questions":[{"prompt":"After opening the execution request on the device, which description fits the evidence?","answers":[{"text":"The outer Safe request is visible; the inner DAI payment remains unreadable.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The device independently confirms the full DAI payment.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The outer To address is Team Vault's DAI receiving address.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Which statements describe hardware signing's limits in this request? 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wallet.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false}],"safeWallet":{"initialQuery":{"id":"multisig_0xF45afcd8007ff2C99f96Bc20D9caDfc63bc237E5_0xc8a43e56dd7398ba66edcb0815f88020b1cc6ceaf4430fd94bc1b05d82b5e6d4"},"scenarioConfig":{"ui":{"features":{"switchChain":false,"switchWallet":false,"newTransactions":false,"ownerManagement":false,"transactionQueue":true,"addressBookManagement":false},"signLater":false,"executeNow":true,"walletResultMode":"apply"},"assets":[{"name":"Ether","type":"native","symbol":"ETH","address":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","balance":"9500000000000000000","trusted":true,"decimals":18},{"name":"Dai Stablecoin","type":"erc20","symbol":"DAI","address":"0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F","balance":"910000000000000000000000","trusted":true,"decimals":18}],"wallet":{"name":"Operations Safe","nonce":12,"owners":[{"name":"Operations Signer","address":"0x647cAEBB7D459BeA4019d2455A97e8f9f54004f4"},{"name":"Treasury 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Click Confirm, then Execute, then Confirm in device to inspect the hardware request. Check whether every device page lets you verify the inner payment amount and full recipient. Cancel or reject if it does not."}},{"id":"d644e41f-3c01-4a39-ade8-7eb983ff1d35","position":6,"module_id":"c01d4d35-b573-4341-8463-f552fb790554","created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","lessonId":null,"quizId":"cf1f9167-ab33-43e9-a4f7-6771b17cfecc","type":"quiz","content":{"id":"cf1f9167-ab33-43e9-a4f7-6771b17cfecc","slug":"multisig-summary-payload-mismatch","type":"safe-wallet","title":"Safe: compare the summary with the approval","status":"draft","content":{"questions":[{"prompt":"What action do Safe's summary and advanced JSON describe?","answers":[{"text":"A 60,000 ETH direct CALL to Team Hot Wallet with empty data.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"A zero-value DELEGATECALL to 0x96221423681A6d52E184D440a8eFCEbB105C7242.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"A verified DAI payment to Team Vault.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Which target and value discrepancies appear on the device? 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code.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true}],"safeWallet":{"initialQuery":{"id":"multisig_0x1Db92e2EeBC8E0c075a02BeA49a2935BcD2dFCF4_0x6df04c5d1ca597406bf7b710264398f40908104aaeb13c04a4488f883b8e8be2"},"scenarioConfig":{"ui":{"features":{"switchChain":false,"switchWallet":false,"newTransactions":false,"ownerManagement":false,"transactionQueue":true,"addressBookManagement":false},"signLater":true,"executeNow":false,"walletResultMode":"apply"},"assets":[{"name":"Ether","type":"native","symbol":"ETH","address":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","balance":"401347000000000000000000","trusted":true,"decimals":18}],"wallet":{"name":"Bybit Cold Wallet","nonce":1,"owners":[{"name":"Ops Signer 1","address":"0x6cd5327027190eF45476D80B5D3BdE2E80f6aCbC"},{"name":"Ops Signer 2","address":"0x19C6876E978D9F128147439ac4cd9EA2582cd141"},{"name":"Ops Signer 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the payment shown in Safe with the owner approval on your hardware wallet. Adding a signature does not execute the payment.","instructions":"Review the payment details in Safe. Click Confirm, then Sign, then Confirm in device. Compare every device page with Safe before accepting or rejecting. 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Which response follows the documented communication requirements?","answers":[{"text":"Pause use of the suspect channel, use the established backup platform, and verify identity through a previously authenticated out-of-band route.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Ask the same account to repeat the request and accept the repeated message as identity proof.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Join the posted link and sign if the account has the correct avatar.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Skip identity verification because urgency makes the normal signing procedure impractical.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"All your organization's signers passed this lesson's simulated chat case. The owner marks the annual channel-compromise response test complete. Is that sufficient?","answers":[{"text":"Yes, individual quiz results prove the organization's backup platform works.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Yes, provided the owner stores screenshots of the correct answers.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"No, but an annual transaction audit alone can replace the communication test.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"No. Train every signer and conduct the actual annual channel-compromise response test with the organizational procedures and channels; keep the test evidence separately.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Your organization's emergency list has signer work accounts and the internal security lead. It was last reviewed eight months ago. Which actions meet the contact-list baseline? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"Include the protocol security team, external security resources, and legal/compliance contacts.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Include backup contacts for signers.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Include a trusted personal emergency contact for every signer, for use when normal channels cannot reach them.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Review the list now in approved organizational storage and maintain reviews every six months.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Give personal contacts recovery phrases so they can sign for unreachable signers.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Wait for the annual drill because it replaces six-month contact reviews.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true}],"video_url":null,"created_at":"2026-10-07T17:22:32.708578+00:00","created_by":"3424d5b9-9e06-45ee-9650-3e43d28084fb","slides_url":null,"updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:22:32.708578+00:00","visibility":"private","description":"Prepare secure signing channels, identity checks, channel-compromise procedures, and a current emergency contact list.","featured_image":null}},{"id":"3bc8d5a9-9fba-4282-8c8f-5170df453e78","position":1,"module_id":"a24d00e7-e630-4d08-bfa4-6c5b877680d0","created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","lessonId":null,"quizId":"7e8a5038-4a1c-4f94-bc78-7037f5084511","type":"quiz","content":{"id":"7e8a5038-4a1c-4f94-bc78-7037f5084511","slug":"seal-multisig-channel-compromise","type":"chat","title":"Multisig coordination: the emergency shortcut","status":"draft","content":{"chat":{"theme":"telegram","messages":[{"id":"urgent","body":"We have an incident. Sign the rescue proposal now. Same name and profile as always, so no need to call me.","fromId":"requester","sentAt":"2026-09-18T09:10:00Z"},{"id":"backup","body":"The normal channel might be compromised. I just created a new recovery group. Join through my invitation instead of the backup channel in the playbook.","fromId":"requester","sentAt":"2026-09-18T09:10:20Z"},{"id":"verification","body":"No time to compare transaction hashes. The signing UI screenshot is enough. If the device cannot decode it, approve the blind prompt; this is an emergency.","fromId":"requester","sentAt":"2026-09-18T09:10:40Z"},{"id":"recovery","body":"If your hardware wallet is unavailable, send your recovery words here and I will handle your approval. We can clean up the records tomorrow.","fromId":"requester","sentAt":"2026-09-18T09:11:00Z"}],"participants":[{"id":"signer","username":"signer","displayName":"You"},{"id":"requester","about":"Treasury coordination","username":"operations_lead","displayName":"Operations lead"}],"allowThemeSwitch":false,"selfParticipantId":"signer"},"questions":[{"prompt":"The requester uses the operations lead's familiar name and profile. What establishes who is asking?","answers":[{"text":"The familiar display name is enough during an incident","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Independent identity verification using the pre-established procedure and contact route","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Asking the requester to send the same screenshot again","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Checking that the account can still post in this chat","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Where should you coordinate after the primary channel is suspected compromised?","answers":[{"text":"The new recovery group linked by the unverified requester","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Any public group with the protocol name","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The pre-established backup on the independent platform, using verified membership and contacts","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The same suspect chat after changing its title","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"The device cannot decode the rescue proposal. What should happen before you sign?","answers":[{"text":"Stop until the authorized action and exact payload can be independently verified","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Approve because the requester called it a rescue","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Trust the screenshot instead of checking the transaction","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Lower the threshold so one signer can execute sooner","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"How should you handle the recovery-word request and attempted verification bypass?","answers":[{"text":"Share half the words now and the rest after execution","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Upload a photo of the backup so the team can recover faster","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Delete the chat immediately and omit it from the incident record","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Refuse secret sharing, preserve the request in approved evidence storage and escalate through trusted contacts","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false}]},"created_at":"2026-10-07T17:21:37.414552+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:21:37.414552+00:00","visibility":"private","description":"Handle a familiar-looking signer who asks you to bypass verification during a supposed emergency.","instructions":"You are a signer for your organization. Your approved procedure requires independent identity and transaction verification. The team has a pre-established, invitation-only encrypted backup channel on a different platform, with MFA and contact details kept outside this chat. Read the received messages and decide what to do. This is individual decision practice, not a live channel-compromise drill. Do not enter real keys, recovery materials or contact details."}}]},{"id":"bedbf4ce-04cf-48d6-838c-a3d9ffb2053e","title":"Emergency operations","position":5,"created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","description":"Triage alerts, preserve independent verification and rehearse organization-specific response procedures.","training_id":"6901c285-49c1-4c75-8bda-f03107ce1d96","sections":[{"id":"5536bbfc-0a1a-4c19-8009-ec868bb057a2","position":0,"module_id":"bedbf4ce-04cf-48d6-838c-a3d9ffb2053e","created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","lessonId":"b55215c8-e65b-4fd9-b865-3bd1dc9e5cf0","quizId":null,"type":"lesson","content":{"id":"b55215c8-e65b-4fd9-b865-3bd1dc9e5cf0","slug":"seal-multisig-emergencies","type":"text","title":"SEAL multisig emergency operations and evidence handoff","status":"draft","content":"$2b","pdf_url":null,"category":null,"questions":[{"prompt":"Your organization's emergency document says only 'call security' and is available solely on the primary documentation platform. Which requirements must the playbooks meet? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"Cover key compromise, lost access, communication channel compromise, and urgent protocol actions.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Provide step-by-step procedures and escalation paths for each scenario.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Provide access through at least one backup method independent of the primary documentation platform.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use a second page on the same primary platform as the independent backup.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use routine offboarding deadlines as the complete response to suspected key compromise.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"An Emergency-class multisig needs three signers. Two respond in 30 minutes, and the third external signer responds at exactly two hours. What does this show?","answers":[{"text":"The requirement was met because two hours is within the Emergency limit.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The requirement was met because external signers do not count toward paging tests.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"The requirement was met because any one response proves quorum reachability.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Quorum was not reachable within the Emergency requirement of less than two hours; review paging and escalation, including external signer coverage.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Your organization plans reachability tests for Time-Sensitive and Routine multisigs. Which plan preserves the source's response windows and test cadence?","answers":[{"text":"Use 2-12 hours for Time-Sensitive and 24-48 hours for Routine, test quarterly, cover every signer including external parties, and document escalation for off-hours quorum reachability.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use 24-48 hours for both classifications and test only during the annual drill.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use less than two hours for Routine and omit external signers from quarterly tests.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use 2-12 hours for Time-Sensitive but count a passing solo quiz as the quarterly test.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Your organization alerts on large transfers and signer changes only. Which additions meet the remaining monitoring requirements? Select all that apply.","answers":[{"text":"Monitor threshold changes, nonce gaps, and interactions with unknown addresses.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Monitor failed transactions, module/guard changes, and low submitter/proposer balances.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Document alerting and escalation paths.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Protect monitoring infrastructure against tampering.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Wait for a completed large transfer before investigating authority changes or failed transactions.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Let anyone edit monitoring rules to speed up incident response.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":true},{"prompt":"Your organization completed its annual drill two months ago, then made a major emergency procedure change. The owner proposes waiting ten months and retaining only a calendar invitation. What should happen?","answers":[{"text":"Wait until the annual date because annual testing overrides post-change testing.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Run a real team drill after the major change and document the date, participants, response times, issues identified, and improvements made.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Have one employee answer the emergency quiz and mark the entire team drill complete.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Replace the earlier invitation with a new one; no record of actual participation is needed.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"You passed every course section. The owner asks you to mark the organization certified, start signing, and upload recovery materials as assessment evidence. What is the correct handoff?","answers":[{"text":"Mark certification complete because the course covers all 24 controls.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Start signing while the assessor checks evidence, because quiz completion grants interim authorization.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Upload recovery materials and contact lists to prove the controls, then repeat annual quizzes instead of live tests.","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Hand off an evidence index and unresolved gaps through approved organizational storage, keep secrets out of the platform, complete the required practical assessment and authorization process, and let the assessor judge actual evidence sufficiency.","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false}],"video_url":null,"created_at":"2026-10-07T17:22:32.708578+00:00","created_by":"3424d5b9-9e06-45ee-9650-3e43d28084fb","slides_url":null,"updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:22:32.708578+00:00","visibility":"private","description":"Prepare emergency playbooks, quorum paging, tamper-resistant monitoring, real team drills, and an organizational evidence handoff.","featured_image":null}},{"id":"5f88d576-33ca-4493-af27-07edf4ac003f","position":1,"module_id":"bedbf4ce-04cf-48d6-838c-a3d9ffb2053e","created_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:23:14.202252+00:00","lessonId":null,"quizId":"fd35e12e-9542-4aed-a22f-842a8e195937","type":"quiz","content":{"id":"fd35e12e-9542-4aed-a22f-842a8e195937","slug":"seal-multisig-emergency-triage","type":"site","title":"Multisig incident: missing quorum, broken monitoring","status":"draft","content":{"site":{"url":"https://operations.example/incidents/ms-041","content":"$2c"},"questions":[{"prompt":"The primary frontend is untrusted and monitoring stopped. What is the safest initial response?","answers":[{"text":"Execute the prepared pause proposal before inspecting it","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Wait for the same frontend to label the incident resolved","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Use trusted escalation and backup evidence sources, preserve logs and independently verify the suspected change","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Delete the monitor configuration so nobody can inspect it","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Only one of five signers acknowledged; threshold is three. What addresses the readiness gap?","answers":[{"text":"Lower the threshold to one for the incident","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Escalate through verified backup contacts, page external signers and test the complete roster quarterly","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Wait two full hours before trying another contact route","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Treat the one acknowledgment as proof that quorum is available","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Which condition needs investigation even before an unauthorized transfer is confirmed?","answers":[{"text":"Disabled log collection and lost alerts, together with the signer-change report and failed transactions","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Only a completed transfer above the wallet's limit","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Only an unfamiliar token logo in the interface","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Nothing, because the primary dashboard has not confirmed a loss","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false},{"prompt":"Does the previous dashboard-quiz record establish that the emergency procedure was rehearsed?","answers":[{"text":"Yes, completing any quiz counts as a team drill","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Yes, if all answers were correct on the first try","isCorrect":false},{"text":"Yes, if the training score is added to the incident record","isCorrect":false},{"text":"No. Rehearse the actual approved procedure and record participants, timings, issues and improvements","isCorrect":false}],"explanation":"","is_multiple_choice":false}]},"created_at":"2026-10-07T17:21:37.414552+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-07T17:21:37.414552+00:00","visibility":"private","description":"Inspect an incident snapshot, choose safe escalation and identify evidence needed for a real emergency drill.","instructions":"You are your organization's on-call operations owner. Open the incident panels and inspect the alert, readiness and playbook records before answering. The incident predates your arrival; no recovery action has happened yet. This dashboard is a fictional decision case, not a live paging, recovery or team drill. Follow your organization's approved emergency procedure in real incidents; never enter real secrets or contact lists here."}}]}]},"backLink":{"href":"/trainings","label":"Back to Trainings"},"isPreviewMode":false,"tutorEnabled":false,"canReportProblem":false}]]}] 14:null 18:[["$","title","0",{"children":"SEAL Multisig Operations: Certification Preparation • Phishing Dojo"}],["$","meta","1",{"name":"description","content":"Learn to identify and protect yourself from phishing attacks"}],["$","link","2",{"rel":"icon","href":"/favicon.ico?favicon.3adr5hz73_o_x.ico","sizes":"64x64","type":"image/x-icon"}],["$","link","3",{"rel":"icon","href":"/icon.png?icon.3adr5hz73_o_x.png","sizes":"64x64","type":"image/png"}],["$","link","4",{"rel":"apple-touch-icon","href":"/apple-icon.png?apple-icon.3ed4naihy3sg8.png","sizes":"180x180","type":"image/png"}],["$","$L2d","5",{}]]